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Abstract
Traditional password based authentication schemes are mostly considered in
single server environments. They are unfitted for the multi-server environ-
ments from two aspects. On the one hand, users need to register in each
server and to store large sets of data, including identities and passwords. On
the other hand, servers are required to store a verification table containing
user identities and passwords. Recently, On the base on Sood et al.’s pro-
tocol(2011), Li et al. proposed an improved dynamic identity based authen-
tication and key agreement protocol for multi-server architecture(2012). Li
et al. claims that the proposed scheme can make up the security weaknesses
of Sood et al.’s protocol. Unfortunately, our further research shows that Li
et al.’s protocol contains several drawbacks and can not resist some types of
known attacks, such as replay attack, Deny-of-Service attack, internal attack,
eavesdropping attack, masquerade attack, and so on. In this paper, we fur-
ther propose a light dynamic pseudonym identity based authentication and
key agreement protocol for multi-server architecture. In our scheme, service
providing servers don’t need to maintain verification tables for users. The
proposed protocol provides not only the declared security features in Li et
al.’s paper, but also some other security features, such as traceability and
identity protection.
Keywords: authentication and key agreement; dynamic pseudonym
identity; multi-server architecture; hash function; smart card
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1. Introduction
With the rapid growth of modern computer networks, increasing numbers
of systems contain a certain quantity of service providing servers around the
world and provide services via the Internet. It’s important to verify the
legitimacy of a remote user in a public environment before he/she can ac-
cess the service. But traditional password based authentication schemes are
mostly considered in single server environments. They are unfitted for the
multi-server environments from two aspects. On the one hand, users need to
register in each server and to store large sets of data, including identities and
passwords. On the other hand, servers are required to store a verification
table containing user identities and passwords. [1] firstly proposed a re-
mote authentication scheme using smart card based on Elgamal’s public key
cryptosystem[2], which doesn’t need to maintain verification tables. After
that, numerous smart card based single-server authentication schemes using
one-way hash functions had been proposed[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. However, it is
still hard for a user to use different smart cards to login and access different
remote servers. This is because users still need to remember numerous sets
of identities and passwords. In order to resolve this problem, several schemes
have been proposed to the study of authentication and key agreement in the
multi-server environment[10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16], all of which claim not
to store verification tables. Most of these schemes can be divided into three
categories: hash-based, symmetric cryptosystem based and public-key cryp-
tosystem based. Hash-based protocols are considered to be with the most
efficiency.
Among these schemes, in 2009, Hsiang and Shih proposed a dynamic
identity and one-way hash based remote user authentication protocol for
multi-server architecture without a verification table[10]. However, in 2011,
Sood et al.[11] pointed that Hsiang and Shih’s protocol can not resist many
types of security attacks, such as replay attack, impersonation attack and
stolen smart card attack. Then Sood et al. proposed an improved scheme
which is claimed to achieve user anonymity and resist different types of com-
mon security attacks. Recently, in [16], Li et al. found that Sood et al.’s
protocol is still vulnerable to some types of known attacks, such as replay
attack, stolen smart card attack and so on. Also the mutual authentication
and key agreement phase of Sood et al.’s protocol can not be successfully
finished within some specific scenes. Furthermore, in [16], they proposed an
improved dynamic identity based authentication and key agreement protocol
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for multi-server architecture, which is claimed to remove the aforementioned
weaknesses of Sood et al.’s protocol. Unfortunately, our further research
shows that Li et al.’s protocol contains several drawbacks and can not resist
some types of known attacks, such as leak-of-verifier attack, stolen smart
card attack, eavesdropping attack, replay attack, deny-of-service attack and
forgery attack and so on.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives the overview
of Li et al.’s protocol; Section 3 points out the security weaknesses of the
protocol in details. Section 4 gives our proposed protocol. Security and
performance analysis of our proposed protocol are given in Section 5 and
Section 6. At last, Section 7 presents the overall conclusion.
Table 1: Notations used in Li et. al.’s paper
Ui a user
Sj a service providing server
CS the control server
IDi the identity of Ui
SIDj the identity of Sj
x the master secret key
y the secret number
b a random number chosen by the user for registration
CIDi the dynamic identity generated by Ui for authentication
SK session key shared among the user, the server and CS
Ni1, Ni2, Ni3 random numbers chosen by Ui, Sj and CS
h(·) a one way hash function
⊕ the bitwise XOR operation
|| the bitwise concatenation operation
2. Overview of Li et al.’s protocol
In this section, we give the overview of Li et al.’s proposed protocol, which
is an enhanced scheme from Sood et al.’s protocol. We firstly summarize the
notations used through out Li et al.’s paper in Table 1. Li et al.’s protocol
involves 3 kinds of participants: users(taking Ui for example), service pro-
viding servers(taking Sj for example), and the control server(CS). CS is a
trusted third party responsible for the registration and authentication of the
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users and the service providing servers. CS chooses two security elements
x and y.In the registration phase, Sj obtains h(SIDj ||y) and h(x||y) from
CS via a secure channel. Ui randomly selects a number b, and computes
Ai = h(b||Pi). After the initialization and the registration phases, Ui can get
a smart card from CS via a secure channel. The following elements, h(·),
h(y) and b are stored in the smart card for the user Ui:
Ci = h(IDi||h(y)||Ai)
Di = Bi ⊕ h(IDi||Ai) = h(IDi||x)⊕ h(IDi||Ai)
Ei = Bi ⊕ h(y||x) = h(IDi||x)⊕ h(y||x)
(1)
User
i
U
Control Server 
CS
Service Providing 
Server
i
S
Figure 1: Demonstration of Register, Authentication and key agreement phases of Li et
al.’s protocol
In Ui’s login phase, Ui inserts his smart card into a terminal and in-
puts his identity IDi and password Pi, then computes A
∗
i = h(b||Pi) and
C∗i = h(IDi||h(y)||A
∗
i ). If C
∗
i is equal to the stored Ci, Ui is considered as
a legitimate user. Else, the terminal rejects Ui’s login request. After the
verification, the authentication and key agreement phase takes place among
Ui, Sj and CS, as depicted in Figure 1. We introduce them as follows:
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Step 1: 1 Ui → Sj: {Fi, Gi, Pij, CIDi}.
Ui computes Bi = Di ⊕ h(IDi||Ai) and generates a random number
Ni1. Then Ui computes Fi, Gi, Pij , CIDi as follows:
Fi = h(y)⊕Ni1
Gi = h(Bi||Ai||Ni1)
Pij = Ei ⊕ h(h(y)||Ni1||SIDj)
CIDi = Ai ⊕ h(Bi||Fi||Ni1)
(2)
Then, Ui sends {Fi, Gi, Pij , CIDi}to Sj over a public channel.
Step 2: Sj → CS: {Fi, Gi, Pij, CIDi, SIDj, Ki, Mi }.
After receiving the message from Ui, the server Sj randomly selects
a number Ni2 and computes Ki, Mi as follows:
Ki = h(SIDj||y)⊕Ni2
Mi = h(h(x||y)||Ni2)
(3)
Then Sj sends {Fi, Gi, Pij , CIDi, SIDj, Ki, Mi } to CS over the
public channel.
Step 3: CS → Sj: {Qi, Ri, Vi, Ti }.
After receiving the message from Sj, CS gets Ni2 = Ki⊕h(SIDj ||y)
and M∗ = h(h(x||y)||Ni2). Then CS verifies whether M
∗ is equal
to the received Mi. If not, CS terminates the session; Else, the
legitimacy of Sj is verified by CS. After that, CS computes the
following elements:
Ni1 = Fi ⊕ h(y)
Bi = Pij ⊕ h(h(y)||Ni1||SIDj)⊕ h(y||x)
Ai = CIDi ⊕ h(Bi||Fi||Ni1)
G∗i = h(Bi||Ai||Ni1)
(4)
Then CS verifies whether G∗ is equal to the received Gi. If not,
CS terminates the session; Else, the legitimacy of Ui is verified by
CS. CS randomly selects a number Ni3, and computes the following
1In the description of [16], except for sending the message, this step is included in the
login step.
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elements:
Qi = Ni1 ⊕Ni3 ⊕ h(SIDj ||Ni2)
Ri = h(Ai||Bi)⊕ h(Ni1 ⊕Ni2 ⊕Ni3)
Vi = h(h(Ai||Bi)||h(Ni1 ⊕Ni2 ⊕Ni3))
Ti = Ni2 ⊕Ni3 ⊕ h(Ai||Bi||Nn1)
(5)
Then CS sends {Qi, Ri, Vi, Ti }to Si over a public channel.
Step 4: Sj → Ui: {Vi, Ti}.
After receiving the message from CS, Sj computes:
Ni1 ⊕Ni3 = Qi ⊕ h(SIDj||Ni2)
h(Ai||Bi) = Ri ⊕ h(Ni1 ⊕Ni3 ⊕Ni2)
V ∗i = h(h(Ai||Bi)||h(Ni1 ⊕Ni3 ⊕Ni2))
(6)
Then Sj verifies whether V
∗
i is equal to the received Vi. If not, Sj
terminates the session; Else, the legitimacy of CS is verified by Sj .
After that, Sj sends the message {Vi, Ti} to Ui.
Step 5: After receiving the message from Sj , Ui computes to get V
′
i as follows:
Ni2 ⊕Ni3 = Ti ⊕ h(Ai||Bi||Ni1)
V ′i = h(h(Ai||Bi)||h(Ni2 ⊕ h(Ni3)⊕ h(Ni1)))
(7)
Then Uj verifies whether V
′
i is equal to the received Vi. If not, Ui
terminates the session; Else, the legitimacy of CS and Sj is verified
by Ui.
Finally, Ui, Sj and CS can separately compute the shared session key
SK as follow:
SK = h(h(Ai||Bi)||(Ni1 ⊕Ni2 ⊕Ni3)) (8)
3. Security weakness analysis of the protocol
Although in [16], the authors claimed that their protocol can resist many
types of security attacks. Unfortunately, our further research shows that Li
et al.’s protocol contains several drawbacks and can not resist some types
of known attacks, such as replay attack, deny-of-service attack, smart card
forgery attack, eavesdrop attack and forgery attack. The analysis in details
is described as follows.
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3.1. Replay attack and Deny-of-Service attack
Assume that a malicious attacker can eavesdrop the first sending message
from a legitimate user to the server Sk in Step1 of the authentication and key
agreement phase. If the message {Fi, Gi, Pij, CIDi} is eavesdropped, replay
attacks can easily be launched by retransmitting {Fi, Gi, Pij , CIDi} to Sj .
This type of attacks can trick the server Sk and CS into implementing the
following steps Step2-4. Moreover, SK and CS can not identify the message
replayed by the malicious attackers. Even if the user cannot get the final
correct session key SK, the server Sk and CS have made great consumption
of computing resources, communication resources and storage resources. A
large number of replay attacks launched at the same time will form a Deny-
of-Service attack, which prevents normal visits from legitimating legitimate
users.
3.2. Internal attack
Assume there is an inside malicious user who has a legitimate smart
card. From the elements stored in the smart card, the malicious user can
straightly get h(y). The malicious attacker Uf can firstly compute his/her
Bf(= Df⊕h(IDf ||Af)), and then computes h(y||x) = Ef⊕Bf . By Knowing
h(y) and h(y||x), the attacker can further launch eavesdrop attacks to get
the session key shared among any other users, the related service providing
servers and CS.
3.3. Smart card forgery attack
Li et al.’s protocol lacks of verification of Ai and Bi by CS, thus a ma-
licious attacker known h(y) and h(y||x) in advance can arbitrarily forge a
new smart card. If the attacker wants to forge Us’s smart card, he/she firstly
sets As = Num1 and Bi = Num2, where Num1 and Num2 are two random
numbers with the same length as Ai, Bi. The elements of a forgery smart
card can be further set as:
Cs = h(IDs||h(y)||As) = Cs = h(IDs||h(y)||Num1)
Ds = Bs ⊕ h(IDs||As) = Num2⊕ h(IDs||Num1)
Es = Bs ⊕ h(y||x) = Num2⊕ h(y||x)
(9)
Then if the malicious attacker wants to access the service providing server
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Sj by using this forgery smart card. The first message can be computed as:
Fs = h(y)⊕Ns1
Gs = h(Bs||As||Ns1) = h(Num2||Num1||Ns1)
Psj = Es ⊕ h(h(y)||Ns1||SIDj) = Num2 ⊕ h(y||x)⊕ h(h(y)||Ns1||SIDj)
CIDs = As ⊕ h(Bs||Fs||Ns1) = Num1 ⊕ h(Num2||Fs||Ns1)
(10)
Following Li et al.’s protocol, this message can successfully pass the legit-
imacy verification by CS and Sj . If the random numbers separately chosen
by Sj and CS are Ns2 and Ns3, the malicious attacker, Sj and CS can suc-
cessfully agree on a common session key SK = h(h(Num1||Num2)||(Ns1 ⊕
Ns2 ⊕Ns3)).
3.4. Eavesdropping attack
Assume the authentication and key agreement phase takes place among
the legitimate user Um, the service providing server Sn and the control server
CS.
There is a malicious attacker who has the ability of eavesdropping all of
the messages exchanged among these three participants. Furthermore, The
malicious attacker is assumed to have known h(y), h(y||x) in advance. The
first message is {Fm, Gm, Pmn, CIDm} send from Um. From Fm, Nm1 can
been easily obtained as follow:
Nm1 = h(y)||Fm (11)
Next, Em can be extracted from Pmn, then Bm can be extracted from Em.
The details are described as follows:
Em = Pmn ⊕ h(h(y)||Nm1||SIDn)
Bm = Em ⊕ h(y||x)
(12)
After that from CIDm, Am can also be easily extracted as:
Am = CIDm ⊕ h(Bm||Fm||Nm1) (13)
From the above process, only a sending message via a public channel can
leak crucial security information (Am, Bm, Nm1) of Um. Also Em stored in
Um’s smart card can also be got. Although because of the user anonymity
support, the malicious attacker can not obtain Um’s identity IDm to compute
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Cm and Dm, but next we will describe how to extract the final session key
SK.
After eavesdropping the message send in Step3 or Step4. the malicious
attacker can extract Nm2 ⊕Nm3 from Tm as follow:
Nm2 ⊕Nm3 = Tm ⊕ h(Am||Bm||Ni1) (14)
Now, the malicious attacker can compute the final session key negotiated
among Um, Sn and CS. Furthermore, he/she can decrypted all the encrypted
data between Um and Sn.
3.5. Masquerade attack to pose as a legitimate user
After successfully obtaining security information of a legitimate user(such
as Um) via the eavesdrop attack described in Section 3.4, The attacker can
launch the masquerade attack to act as the legitimate user. By means of
the internal attack, the malicious attackers can know h(y) and h(y||x). By
means of the eavesdrop attack, the malicious attacker can further compute
Am, Bm and Em. By virtue of these information, the malicious attacker can
pose as Um to launch authentication and key agreement phase to any other
service providing server(Take Sp for example) and CS.
Firstly, the malicious attacker randomly select a number NMA and can
successfully forge the first step message to pretend to be Um:
Fm = h(y)⊕NMA
Gm = h(Bm||Am||NMA)
Pmp = Em ⊕ h(h(y)||NMA||SIDp)
CIDm = Am ⊕ h(Bm||Fm||NMA)
(15)
Then assume Sp and CS separately select random numbers Nm2 and Nm3,
and Step2-Step4 are performed normally. Then the malicious attacker, Sj
and CS “successfully” agree on a session key SK = h(h(Am||Bm)||(NMA ⊕
Nm2⊕Nm3)). But unfortunately Sp and CS mistakenly believe that they are
communicating with the legitimate user Um.
3.6. Masquerade attack to pose as a legitimate service providing server
First assume that the malicious attacker has eavesdropped a message
send from Sn to get Ki and Mi. Furthermore assume a legitimate user
Um’s security information has been leaked to the malicious attacker based on
the internal attack and the eavesdrop attack. When Um wants to login the
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server Sn, he/she selects a random number Nm1 and sends the first message
in Step1({Fm, Gm, Pmn, CIDm}) to the service providing server Sn. The
malicious attacker can attack the real server Sn to be down and masquerades
to be Sn himself/herself. After eavesdropping this message, the malicious
attacker can attach Ki and Mi in the first message:{Fm, Gm, Pmn, CIDm,
SIDn, Ki, Mi }. This message can also successfully pass CS’s verification.
Nm3 is the random number selected by CS. After implementing of Step3 and
Step4, the user Um and CS can compute the session key as
SK = h(h(Am||Bm)||h(Nm1 ⊕Ni2 ⊕Nm3)) (16)
And unfortunately Um mistakenly believe that he/she is communicating with
the legitimate true Sn. Although the malicious attacker can not extract the
random number Ni2 from Ki, he/she still can exact the session key SK by
means of “masquerade attack as a legitimate user” described in Section 3.5.
So the malicious attacker can not only masquerade to be the real server, but
also decrypt the encrypted data send from the user in the dark.
4. Our proposed improved protocol
In this section, we will describe an improved protocol to make up the se-
curity weaknesses of Li et al.’s protocol. Our protocol contains three kinds of
participants(the user, the service providing server and the controlling server)
and contains three phases: 1)Initialization and registration phase; 2) login
phase; 3)authentication and key agreement phase. Because the notions are
different in using from those of Li et al.’s protocol in protocol designing and
some new notions are defined, here we firstly give the notations used in our
proposed protocol(Summarize in Table 2). We show the protocol in Figure
2 and provide more details as follows.
4.1. Initialization and registration phase
Assume the control server CS is a trusted third party responsible for
registration and authentication of users and service providing servers. CS
chooses two random numbers x and y.
The registration phase of the user Ui is as follows:
Step 1: The user Ui freely choose his/her identity IDi and password Pi, and
randomly choose a number b. Then Ui compute Ai = h(b||Pi), and
submits the message {IDi, b, Ai} to CS via a secure channel.
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Figure 2: The implement phases of our proposed protocol
Step 2: After receiving the message, CS first verifies user’s legitimacy. Then,
CS computes PIDi = h(IDi||b), Bi = h(PIDi||x). CS sends Bi to
Ui via a secure channel.
Step 3: After receiving the smart card, Ui computes Ci = h(IDi||Ai) and
Di = Bi ⊕ h(PIDi ⊕ Ai). Then Ui entersCi, Di, h(·) and b into the
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Table 2: Notations used in our proposed protocol
Ui a user
Sj a service providing server
CS the control server
IDi the identity of Ui
SIDj the identity of Sj
TSi Timestamp value generated by Ui
x the secret number only known to CS
y the secret number only known to CS
b a random number chosen by the user
d a random number chosen by the service providing server
PIDi the protected pseudonym identity of Ui
PSIDj the protected pseudonym identity of Sj
SK session key shared among the user, the server and CS
Ni1, Ni2, Ni3 random numbers chosen by Ui, Sj and CS
h(·) a one way hash function
⊕ the bitwise XOR operation
|| the bitwise concatenation operation
smart card. At last, the smart card contains (Ci, Di, h(·), b).
For the service providing server Sj, he/she first chooses a random number
d, and use his/her identity Sj to register with CS. CS computes PSIDj =
h(SIDj||d), BSj = h(PSDj||y). Then CS sends BSj to Sj via a secure
channel. Sj stores BSj and d in his/her memory.
4.2. Login phase
When the user Ui wants to login to access the server Sj, Ui inserts his
smart card into a terminal and inputs his/her identity IDi and password
Pi, then computes A
∗
i = h(b||Pi) and C
∗
i = h(IDi||A
∗
i ). If C
∗
i is equal to
the stored Ci, Ui is considered as a legitimate user. Otherwise, the terminal
rejects Ui’s login request.
4.3. Authentication and key agreement phase
Step 1: Ui → Sj: {Fi, Pij, CIDi, Gi, PIDi, TSi}.
Ui chooses a random number Ni1 and generates a current Timestamp
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value TSi. Then Ui computes Bi, Fi, CIDi, Pij , Gi as follows:
Bi = Di ⊕ Ci
Fi = Bi ⊕Ni1
Pij = h(Bi ⊕ h(Ni1||SIDj||PIDi||TSi))
CIDi = IDi ⊕ h(Bi||Ni1||TSi||“00
′′)
Gi = b⊕ h(Bi||Ni1||TSi||“11
′′)
(17)
Where, “00” is a 2-bit binary-“0”, and “11” is a 2-bit binary-“1”.
Then, Ui sends {Fi, Pij, CIDi, Gi, PIDi, TSi}to Sj over a public
channel.
Step 2: Sj → CS: {Fi, Pij, CIDi, Gi, PIDi, TSi, Ji, Ki, Li, Mi, PSIDj}.
After receiving the message from Ui, the server Sj first checks whether
the session delay is within the tolerable time interval ∆T . Assume
the current time is TSj . If TSj − TSi > ∆T , the session is timeout
and Sj terminates the session; Otherwise, Sj continues to perform
the following operations.
Sj randomly selects a number Ni2 and computes Ji, Ki, Li, Mi as
follows:
Ji = BSj ⊕Ni2
Ki = h(Ni2||BSj||Pij||TSi)
Li = SIDj ⊕ h(BSj ||Ni2||TSi||“00
′′)
Mi = d⊕ h(BSj ||Ni2||TSi||“11
′′)
(18)
Where, ‘00” is a 2-bit binary-“0”, and “11” is a 2-bit binary-“1”.
Then Sj sends {Fi, Pij, CIDi, Gi, PIDi, TSi, Ji, Ki, Li, Mi,
PSIDj} to CS over the public channel.
Step 3: CS → Sj: {Pi, Qi, Ri, Vi }.
After receiving the message from Sj, CS first checks whether the
session delay is within the allow time interval ∆T . Assume the cur-
rent time is TSCS. If TSCS − TSi > ∆T , the session is timeout and
CS terminates the session; CS continues to perform the following
operations.
CS computes BSj = h(PSIDj||y), Ni2 = Ji ⊕ BSj and K
∗ =
h(Ni2||BSj||Pij||TSi). Then CS verifies whether K
∗
i is equal to the
received Ki. If not, CS terminates the session; Otherwise, CS con-
tinues to perform the following operations. CS computes the follow-
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ing elements:
Bi = h(PIDi||x)
Ni1 = Fi ⊕Bi
IDi = CIDi ⊕ h(Bi||Ni1||TSi||“00
′′)
SIDi = Li ⊕ h(BSj ||Ni2||TSi||“00
′′)
P ∗ij = h(Bi ⊕ h(Ni1||SIDj||PIDi||TSi))
(19)
Then CS verifies whether P ∗ij is equal to the received Pij . If not,
CS terminates the session; Otherwise, CS continues to compute the
following elements:
b = Gi ⊕ h(Bi||Ni1||TSi||“11
′′)
d = Mi ⊕ h(BSj ||Ni2||TSi||“11
′′)
PID∗i = h(IDi||b)
PSID∗j = h(SIDj ||d)
(20)
Then CS verifies whether PID∗i = PIDi and PSID
∗
j = PSIDj. If
not, CS terminates the session; Otherwise, CS makes sure the mes-
sages are from real Ui and Sj . After the verification, CS randomly
selects a number Ni3, and computes Pi, Qi, Ri Vi as follows:
Pi = Ni1 ⊕Ni3 ⊕ h(SIDj||Ni2||BSj)
Qi = h(Ni1 ⊕Ni3)
Ri = Ni2 ⊕Ni3 ⊕ h(IDi||Ni1||Bi)
Vi = h(Ni2 ⊕Ni3)
(21)
Then CS sends {Pi, Qi, Ri, Vi }to Si over a public channel.
Step 4: Sj → Ui: {Ri, Vi}.
After receiving the message from CS, Sj firstly computes to get the
following elements:
Ni1 ⊕Ni3 = Pi ⊕ h(SIDj||Ni2||BSj)
Q∗i = h(Ni1 ⊕Ni3)
(22)
Then Sj verifies whether Q
∗
i is equal to the received Qi. If not, Sj
terminates the session; Otherwise, the legitimacy of CS is verified
by Sj . After that, Sj sends the message {Ri, Vi} to Ui.
Step 5: After receiving the message from Sj, Ui computes to get V
∗
i as fol-
lows:
Ni2 ⊕Ni3 = Ri ⊕ h(IDi||Ni1||Bi)
V ∗i = h(Ni2 ⊕Ni3)
(23)
14
Then Uj verifies whether V
∗
i is equal to the received Vi. If not, Ui
terminates the session; Otherwise, the legitimacy of CS and Sj is
verified by Ui.
Finally, Ui, Sj and CS can separately compute the common session key
SK as follow:
SK = h((Ni1 ⊕Ni2 ⊕Ni3)||TSi)) (24)
4.4. password updating phase
After password based verification in the registration phase, the user Ui’s
password Pi does not appear in Bi. Thus password updating/changing can
happen in anytime. Ui need to submit his/her IDi and A
′
i with new password
P ′i to CS via a secure channel. CS updates Ui’s password in its verification
table. Meanwhile, Ui can update the parameters in his/her smart card:
C ′i = h(IDi||A
′
i)
D′i = Bi ⊕ h(PIDi ⊕ A
′
i)
(25)
4.5. dynamic identity updating phase
In order to prevent malicious attackers linking eavesdropped messages
of different sessions, we can update the user’s PID periodically to provide
security. Ui reselects a random number b
#, and compute A#i = h(b
#||Pi).
Then Ui submits {IDi,b
#, A#i } to CS. After verifying Ui’s legitimacy, CS
recomputes PID#i = h(IDi||b
#), B#i = h(PID
#
i ||x) and submits B
#
i to Ui
via a secure channel. After receiving B#i , Ui computes C
#
i = h(IDi||A
#
i ),
D
#
i = B
#
i ⊕ h(PID
#
i ⊕ A
#
i ). At last the smart card is updated to {C
#
i ,
D
#
i ,h(·), b
#}. Now Ui’s protected pseudonym identity PIDi is dynamically
changed to PID#i .
Service providing servers can also periodically update their protected
pseudonym identities. Take Sj for example, Sj reselects a random num-
ber d#, and use his/her identity Sj to register with CS. CS computes
PSID
#
j = h(SIDj ||d
#), BS#j = h(PSD
#
j ||y). Then CS sends BS
#
j to Sj
via a secure channel. Sj updates BS
#
j and d
# in his/her memory.
5. Security analysis of our protocol
In this section, we summarize security analysis of our proposed protocol
and compare it with other two related protocols. First we list security func-
tionality comparison among our protocol and other two related protocols in
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Table 3. It demonstrates that our protocol is more secure than other two
related protocols.
Table 3: Security functionality comparison of our protocol and two other related protocols
Security Our proposed Li et al.’s Sood et al.’s
functionality protocol protocol(2012) protocol(2011)
User anonymity Yes Yes Yes
Mutual authentication Yes Yes Yes
Session key agreement Yes Yes Yes
Password updating Yes Yes Yes
Dynamic identity updating Yes No No
Traceability Yes No No
Identity protection Yes No No
Resistance of Insider attack Yes No No
Resistance of Stolen smart card attack Yes Yes No
Resistance of replay attack Yes No No
Resistance of Deny-of-Service attack Yes No No
Resistance of eavesdrop attack Yes No No
Resistance of masquerade attack Yes No No
Here we discuss the main security features of our proposed protocol in
details:
5.1. Providing user anonymity
For the user Ui, we use PIDi instead of IDi. By using protected pseudonym
identities of users instead of real ones, the malicious attacker can not get user
identities. Meanwhile service providing servers can not know users’ real iden-
tities either. In this way, our protocol provides user anonymity. Furthermore,
updating users’ pseudonym identities periodically can prevent the malicious
attacker linking eavesdropped messages of different sessions from the same
user.
5.2. Providing traceability
Despite of user anonymity, CS can still extract users’ real identities and
link them with protected pseudonym identities. This make our protocol have
the feature of traceability. This is newly-added function in our proposed
protocol different from Li et al.’s protocol.
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5.3. Providing identity protection
Using protected pseudonym identities of users and service providing servers
ensures that only legitimate CS can get their real identities. This can prevent
the leakage of private user identities and server identities to malicious at-
tackers. Moreover, in order to prevent malicious attackers link eavesdropped
messages of different sessions, protected pseudonym identities of users and
service providing servers are dynamic and can changed in any time.
5.4. Resistance of insider attack and smart card forgery attack
As in Section 3.2, within Li et al.’s protocol, an internal attack can cause
information leakage. h(y) and h(y||x) are the common parameters for all
users, which can further launch eavesdrop attacks, smart card forgery attacks,
masquerade attacks and so on. In our proposed protocol, we do not straightly
use h(y), h(x), h(y||x) directly. Take the user Uf as insider attacker for
example, We use Bf = h(PIDf ||x) and compute to get Cf , Df in his/her
smart card. Uf can not guess to generate parameters of any other users’
smart cards and can not masquerade as any other legitimate user by using
security information of himself/herself.
5.5. Resistance of stolen smart card attack
In our proposed protocol, we firstly assume that if a smart card is stolen,
physical protection methods can not prevent malicious attackers to get the
stored secure elements. Still take Ui for example, if his/her smart card is
stolen, the malicious attacker can get (Ci, Di, h(·), b). But without inputting
right password Pi, the malicious attacker can not compute Ai, and further
extract Bi from Di.
5.6. Resistance of replay attack and Deny-of-Service attack
Firstly the timestamp value is used in our proposed protocol which makes
the malicious attacker can not use early message to launch replay attacks.
This makes replay attacks and Deny-of-Service attacks hard to be launched.
Using Pij and TSi in computing Ki avoids the case in Li et al.’s protocol:
If Ki and Mi attached by the service providing server Sj are eavesdropped,
they can be used to launch replay attacks, which is described in Section 3.6.
Moreover using and verifying timestamp can reduce the success rate of replay
attacks.
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5.7. Resistance of eavesdrop attack
The malicious attacker can not extract private security information from
eavesdropping messages over public channels. Different from Li et al.’s pro-
tocol, because of using PID in compute Bi and not sharing h(x) and h(y||x)
between CS and every user , the malicious attacker can not use one user’s
elements to extract any other user’s security elements in our proposed pro-
tocol. Moreover, the malicious attacker can not compute Ni1⊕Ni2⊕Ni3, so
SK can not be computed by the malicious attacker.
5.8. Resistance of masquerade attack
The malicious attacker can not derive Ui’s security information from
eavesdropped sending messages among Ui, Sj and CS; Meanwhile, the ma-
licious attacker can not forge other user’s smart card from known security
information of a malicious inside user. Furthermore, Using the timestamp
value prevents replay of the first message. Because of the above 3 reasons,
users can not be masqueraded by malicious attackers. because of using Pij
and TSi in computing Ki, the malicious attacker can not replay Sj’s mes-
sage to attach to the end of the message in Step 1, thus servers can not be
masqueraded by malicious attackers.
6. Performance Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the computational complexity, computation
overhead, storage overhead of our proposed protocol and give the comparisons
with other two related protocols: Li et al.’ protocol[16] and Sood et al.’s
protocol[11]. Before analyzing in details, we first give the notation Thash as
the time of computing the hash operation. Because XOR and “||” operations
requires very few computations, they are usually omitted in computational
complexity computation.
Table 4: Computational complexity comparison of our protocol and two other related
protocols
Protocols login phase authentication and key agreement phase
Ui Ui Sj CS
Our proposed protocol 2Thash 6Thash 5Thash 8Thash+(optional)5Thash
Li et al.’s protocol(2012) 2Thash 8Thash 4Thash 13Thash
Sood et al.’s protocol(2011) 1Thash 9Thash 4Thash 11Thash
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Firstly, Computational complexity comparison of our protocol and the
other two related protocols is given in Table 4. As in [16], we only take
the login phase, authentication and session key agreement phase into consid-
eration. Different from the description in [16], the description of the login
phase in Li et al.’s protocol relates only to user legitimacy the by terminal.
Similarly, we merge step 2 of the login phase in [16] into the first step of
the authentication and key agreement phase. The similar decryption mod-
ification is adopted to Sood et al.’s protocol[11]. Furthermore, There are
separately 1 time of hash computation for computing SK for the user, the
service providing server and CS, which is not mentioned in Table 4. From
Table 4, it is obvious that our protocol almost has the same computational
complexity with the other two related protocols. In the authentication and
key agreement phase of our proposed protocol, CS have five optional hash
operations, which proving the function of traceability.
Secondly, we discuss about communication overhead, our proposed proto-
col and other two related protocols all require 4 times of message transmission
in the authentication and key agreement phase. Take Ui, Sj and CS for ex-
ample, four times of message transmission are Ui → Sj, Sj → CS, CS → Sj
and Sj → Ui, which is demonstrated in Figure 1 .
Thirdly, just as Li et al.’s protocol and Sood et al.’s protocol, our proposed
protocol also do not require every service providing server to maintain a
verification table. Meanwhile CS maintains a verification table which is
only required to search in the registration phase. CS don’t need to use the
verification table in the authentication and key agreement phase. Each user
only needs to have a smart card. Each service providing server(Take Sj for
example) only needs to store BSj and a randomly chosen numberd obtained
in the registration phase. Besides the verification table, CS only knows x
and y.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, based on discussing the security weaknesses of Li et al.’s
protocol, we propose an improved dynamic pseudonym identity based au-
thentication and key agreement protocol, which is suitable for the multi-
server environment. Compared with related protocols, our proposed pro-
tocol is demonstrated to satisfy all the essential security requirements for
authentication and key agreement in the multi-server environment. Mean-
while, in comparison with Li et al.’s protocol and Sood et al’s protocol, our
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proposed protocol keeps efficient, such as low computational complexity, low
communication overhead and low storage overhead. In the future, we will
survey suitable solutions to further reduce the computational complexity and
improve protocol performance while not reducing security.
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